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Bunge: Towards a Technoethics




Gone are the days of the divine right of kings--or of anyone else, whether 
owner, manager, labor leader, politician, bureaucrat, technologist or scholar. 
Absolute and groundless authority is being contested all over the world : ours 
is an iconoclastic age. Moreover nobody recognizes rights without duties, priv· 
ileges without responsibilities. Everyone is rightly held responsible for what he 
does and even for what he fails to do when he ought to act. And the responsi­
bilities are not to some conveniently distant diety or sovereign, or even to the 
anonymous people, but to definite individuals--superiors, peers, subordinates, 
neighbors, the public, and even possible future humans. 
Moreover the old separations among different kinds of responsibility--moral. 
professional, social, etc.--are being lifted. We are beginning to realize that the 
separation of responsibilities is just a retreat from total responsibility, hence a 
cloak for wrongdoing. A person in charge of something, be it a machine or an­
other individual , is not composed of a number of moral entities but is a single 
person, now acting in one capacity, now in another. And all these various capa­
cities should combine harmoniously. Being an affectionate parent does not ex­
culpate any crime ; being a comptltent engineer does not confer rights of piracy 
on the environment; being an efficient manager does not entitle to oppressing 
others. Every human being has a number of intertwined responsibilities and 
each of them is as personal and intransferable as a joy or a grief. 
This paper examines some of the special responsibilities of the technologist 
in our age of pervasive--and, alas, all too often perverse-technology. We shall 
defend the thesis that the technologist, just like anyone else, is personally re­
sponsible for whatever he does, and that he is responsible to all mankind not 
just to his employers. We shall also claim that the technologist has the duty to 
face, ponder over, and solve his own moral problems. And we shall submit I.hat 
he is singularly privileged to do so, as he can tackle moral problems, and even 
the theory of morality, i.e. ethics, with the help of an approach and a set of 
tools alien to most philosophers and yet promising to deliver the technoethics 
that philosophers have not deigned to work on. To this end we shall put forth 
a value theory allowing one to weigh means and ends, and to conceive of moral 
norms in the image of technological rules. 
1. The inescapable responsibilities of the technofogist 
Look around and you will easily recognize the professions that have most 
contributed to shaping industrial society. They are the scientists, the engineers, 
and the managers (including the politicians). The former have supplied the 
basic knowledge, the engineers have used the latter to design their works, and 
the managers have organized the manpower that has implemented those de-
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signs. The outcome of theilr labors is well known: a new kind of society, one 
that may carry mankind either to a higher evolutionary level or to quick ex­
tinction. 
And yet, paradoxically enough, the sociologist tens us that, by and large, 
scientists, engineers and managers--that is, the main artificers of modern society 
--do not feel constrained or fired by any extraprofessional moral and social re­
sponsibilities. In particular the technologists seem to be indifferent, when not 
outright callous, in the face of large-scale yet avoidable tragedy--unemploy­
ment, poverty, iniquity, opression, war, the mutilation of nature , the squan­
dering·of natural resources, or the debasement of culture. 
Whether or not they have a hand in eliciting any calamities, most scientists, 
engineers and managers disclaim any responsibilities and shut their eyes to suf­
fering and squalor. Worse, their position in society is such that they must play 
blind if they wish to perform efficiently. In fact no professional can do his job 
efficiently if distracted and upset by cries of distress: he must shut himself up 
in his office or laboratory if he is to get on with his specific work, be it investi­
gating, designing, or organizing. Unless, of course, it Is part or his JOb to relieve 
that very distress or at least avert future sources of distress. 
True, some professional bodies have imitated the physicians and adopted 
moral codes ruling their own work. But most of these codes are limited to pro­
fessional responsibilities, so they leave ample margin for irresponsibility. The 
minutiae are taken care of, the great issues pushed aside. Hence the scientist 
feels free to go on with hiis research come what may; the engineer, to go ahead 
with his projects go what or who may; and the manager, to push production or 
sales come or go what or who may. 
Thus, there are hardly any external constraints capable of being internalized 
and preventing the scientist, the engineer and the manager from engaging in 
morally wrong or socially injurious activities gua professionals. Whether or not 
he behaves well towards his fellow human beinl?s is left to his moral conscience 
or, worse, to that of his superiors. Unfortunately conscience, usually wakeful 
in private and professional matters, is rather sleepy when it comes to affecting 
the anonymous lives of others. 
Let me hasten to declare that I am not siding with the enemies of science and 
technology. There is nothing inherently wrong with science, engineering, or 
managing. But there can be much evil in the goals which either of them is made 
to serve, as well as in some of the side effects accompanying the best of goals. 
If the goals are evil--as is the case with genocide, the oppression of minorities or 
nations, the cheating of consumers, the deception of the public, or the corrup­
tion of culture--then, of course, whoever serves them engages in evildoing, even 
if not legally sanctioned as wrongdoing. In this case the scientist, engineer or 
manager becomes a mere instrument. 
Instruments are morally inert and socially not responsible. Hence, when act­
ing as a 'tool,  the scientist, engineer or manager will refuse to take any blame 
except when failing to deliver the goods--though, inconsistently enough, he is 
not above accepting praise when successful. If taken to task he is apt to plead 
innocent or claim to have acted under duress (Befehlnotst.and); he may go so 
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far as to react indignantly. Obviously, he does this because of either excessive 
humility or excessive arrogance. In the former case he crawls under his super­
iors, in the latter he climbs above ordinary mankind; in either case he places 
himself beyond common decency. 
The scientist, engineer or manager may well wash his hands but this will not 
free him from moral duties or social responsibilities--not only qua a human being 
and a citizen, but also as a professional. And this because, let us recall, they more 
than any other occupational group are responsible for the shape the world is in. 
You cannot manipulate the world as if it were a chunk of clay and a� the same 
time disclaim all responsibility for what you do or refuse to do, particulr.rly 
since your skills are needed to repair whatever damages you may have done or 
at least to forestall future such damages. In short, the engineer and the man­
ager, precisely because ot the tremendous power they wield or contribute to 
building up, have a greater not a diminished moral and social responsibility. 
This being so, they had better face it. 
2. The technologist is tom between conflicting interests 
Suppose a team of engineers is in charge of the design and construction of 
an industrial plant. What is expected from them? A lot, to wit: 
M: The management expects an efficient and profitable plant. 
Yi_: The workers expect satisfactory working conditions. 
N: The neighbors expect a polution-free operation. 
T: The professional colleagues expect a technologically advanced design, ex­
ecution and operation of the project. 
C: The consumers expect useful and reasonably priced products. 
In addition, the unemployed expect a new source of jobs; the suppliers, sub· 
stantial orders; the banks, a new client; and the government, another source of 
revenue or perhaps a new funnel for subsidy. 
The engineer can ignore some of these expectations and demands but not all 
of them, the more so since they are not all mutually compatible. For example, 
if the management demands and obtains a minimization of costs together with 
a maximization of profits, then all the other groups affected by the project will 
be disappointed. Consequently the engineer will ignore some groups, favor 
others, and try to compromise with still others. Obviously, in making decisions 
of this kind he poses and solves moral problems. And he does it by adopting, 
tacitly or explicitly� some moral code or other. 
Every moral code boils down to a ranking of interests--or, to put it in a 
more polite way, moral codes rank values. To abbreviate, write 'A > .B.' to 
designate the proposition "A is preferable to .B", or "There exists an individual 
or a group to whom the value of A is greater than the value of B.." Then our 
engineers are faced with, among others, the following moral codes: 
Private interest morality: .M..takes precedence over all others. 
Professional interest morality: .!.takes precedence over all others. 
Public interest morality :  C > N > W > M> T . 
The choice among these possibilities will depend in tum upon the overall 
moral code of the decision makers--and who the decision makers are depends 
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in tum upon the kind of firm and the kind of society. In the ideal society-­
which, alas, isnon-existent-public interest morality prevails, so that engineers 
and managers are, together with politicians, servants of the community. But let 
us not argue about this point: all that matters to our present concern is that 
every technologist, in any society, faces conflicting interests and makes moral 
decisions that agree with certain moral codes while disagreeing with others. In 
short, the technologist--whether engineer or manager--is a moral agent even if 
his decisions and actions are regarded as immoral by those who are hurt by 
them. And, as we all know, the technologist can harm, either by misusing good 
technology or by employing technology that is inherently evil. But this last 
concept deserves a separate section. 
3. Not all technology is good 
I submit that all pure science is good or at worst indifferent since, by defin­
ition, it is concerned only with the improvement of our models of the world, 
and knowledge is a good in itself. On the other hand, technology is concerned 
with human action upon things and men. That is, technology gives power over 
things and men--and not all power is good to everyone. Just think of than.alol­
ogy or the technology of killing: the design of tactics and strategies of aggres· 
sion, of weaponry and defoliants, of extermination camps and so on . .AU this is 
inherently evil by any moral code except, of course, that of the mass murder­
ers. And whatever spinoff it may have by way of useful gadgetry this is by far 
outweighed by its evil effects--the destruction of human lives, the disruption of 
family and friendship bonds, the increase in aggressivity, violence and callous­
ness, and the mutilation of the environment. 
Surely individuals, groups and nations have the right to defend themselves 
from aggressors and oppressors, if need be with the force 0if arms. But if they 
leave defense, which is a political matter, in the hands of the thanatologist, he 
is apt to counsel attack as the best defense. And nowadays, with the emer­
gence of a tightly knit international system, any local war can engulf a whole 
area and even the entire world in which case, given the nuclear bomb stock­
pile, the human species could be wiped out. 'Ihese platitudes bear repetition 
not only because we should do something about the danger of any wg'"r but be­
cause modern warfare is eminently technological and therefore a reminder that 
not all technology is good. 
Being morally ambivalent, technology should be controlled instead of being 
allowed to develop unbridled in the interest of whatever group can afford it. 
In other words, the technologist must be held not only technically, but also 
morally responsible for whatever he designs or executes: not only should his 
artifacts be optimally efficient bu.t, far from being harmful, they should be 
beneficial, and not only'in the short run but also in the long term. Don't tell 
me that only a free agent can be held morally responsible, so that a technolo­
gist acting under orders from above must be exempted from any blame: this 
was Adolf Eichmann's line of defense. If ordered to do something evil, the 
technologist is free to refuse to take the order; if necessary he can leave his job, 
or he can sabotage his project, or he can fight it. Of course, he may be pun-
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ished for refusing to obey. But this is part of the game of human life--any kind 
of human life-in society--any society. The more responsible a position, the 
more risky it is--but also the more rewarding. 
The technologist is morally responsible for his professional actions because 
these ensue from deliberate and rational decisions in the light or the darkness 
of some moral code or other. The technologist is responsible f2I. his profes­
sional work and he is responsible to all those affected by it, not only to his 
employer. A technologists intent on pleasing his employer only, with a total 
disregard for the interests of everyone else, is an accomplice or an instrument 
rather than a whole professional facing his entire set of responsibilities. Just as 
the good politician (whether or not he is successful) makes the right use of 
power, so the good technologist makes the right use of his knowledge and 
know-how, which is their use for the good of mankind. And this is not a piece 
of rhetoric, for, if we are to survive, we must try to avert the disasters, of in­
creasing magnitude and in increasing numbers, brought about with the help of 
technology. I do not mean just the effects of inherently evil technology but 
also the morally wrong and the technically shortsighted use of potentially good 
technology. Suffice it to mention the covering of black soil by highways, the 
unchecked burning of fossil fuels, the degrading of forests into the shopping 
catalogues called newspapers, and the Great Air and Water Robberies. 
Every large-scale technological project is apt to have a strong impact on 
both nature and society. (Just think of the biological and social changes 
brought about by the building of a dam.) Therefore, if the obnoxious side 
effects of any such project are to be minimized, its design should not be left in 
the hands of engineers alone, particularly if they are anxious to please their em­
ployers. The community affected by the project has the right to keep it under 
the control of other specialists·-applied social scientists, public health officials, 
city planners, conservationists, etc.--to the point of vetoing the whole thing if 
its negative effects are likely to outweigh its social benefits. It is a question not 
of slowing down technological progress but of preventing progress in one 
respect (e.g. engineering design) from blocking advancement in other respects. 
Because of the close relationships among the physical, biological and social 
aspects of any large-scale technological project, advanced large-scale technology 
cannot be one-sided, in the service of narrow interests, shortsighted, and be­
yond moral control: it is many-sided, socially oriented, farsighted, and morally 
bridled. But none of this is possible as long as the technologist regards himself 
as a mere employee and hides behind the economic or political leadership. The 
technologist, to be a good technologist, must regard himself as a trustee and a 
leader. In other words, competent, socially beneficial and morally inspired 
technology calls for global technocracy--the rule of experts in all fields of 
human action. But this is another story. 
4. Technology as a source of inspiraffon for ethics 
It is easier to scold the scientist or the technologist for failing to li\re up to 
his moral responsibilities, than to recommend him the reading of a treatise on 
ethics for his moral edification. Indeed , moral philosophy is under-developed, 
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so much so that it has ignored the special problems posed by science and tech­
nology. Moreover, it won't be able to tackle these problems unless it learns a 
thing or two from science and technology. I shall proceed to indicate three 
lessons ethics has yet to learn from contemporary technology. 
A first lesson is that the classical distinction between what is and what 
ought to be can no longer be maintained in the face of post-behaviorist psy­
chology and of cybernetics. In fact we have learned that every control system, 
be it a furnace with thermostat or an organism endowed with a nervous sys­
tem, has an ought built into it in the fonn of a set of final or goal states which 
the system tries to attain or to keep. Any such system behaves in such a way 
that its .M. approaches its .Ql.!2ht, the size of the misalignment thus being re­
duced. Similarly motivation studies on higher animals have shown that they 
select a goal and proceed to attain it by successive trials, a successful sequence 
of such attempts bringing about the coincidence between what is and what 
ought to be. The lessons for ethics are that not all oughts are beyond reach, 
and not all of them are lofty ideals. 
A second lesson ethics ought to learn from science and technology is that 
fact and value, far from being at odds, become blended in action, and that this 
synthesis is consecrated by certain action theories such as statistical decision 
theory. But before ethics can learn this lesson it must purge itself from the 
idealistic view that value, or the good, is an autonomous entity. A fresh look 
at the behavior of higher animals shows that values are not entities but proper-
ties the organism assigns certain entities. Thus there is no such thing as 'The 
Good, but rather a whole set of things and events that we, or other organisms, 
value as good. (In other words, every value is the value of a valuation function 
the domain of which is the set of things or events.) Once values are recognized 
as an outcome of the valuation activity of an organism, they cease to be dis­
joint from facts: they become aspects of certain facts. Moreover, i.n decision 
theory values join with another property of facts, namely their probability. In 
fact the very definition of a rational decision as that which maximizes the ex· 
pected uti1ity (or subjective value) involves such a synthesis of fact and value. 
A third lesson moral philosophers can learn from scientists and technolo­
gists is the way to conceive of moral norms. Traditionally these have been re­
garded not as statements but as prohibitions or exhortations: as such they 
would both hover above the world of fact and creep under the world of rea­
son. So much so that they would have to be handled by a special logic--deontic 
logic. This view is unacceptable to a naturalist who regards reason and value as 
so many hypostatizations of certain organismic activities, namely reasoning and 
valuing respectively. It is unacceptable to a rationalist or an empiricist, both of 
whom would like moral rules to be subject to some control other than author­
ity or tradition. Indeed an imperative such as Thou shalt dox! or Thou shalt 
not do y! looks impregnable to reason and experience. 
We have had enough groundless orders: it is high time to treat ourselves as 
rational and responsible beings capable of adopting, discussing and rejecting 
grounded rules of conduct. Which is exactly what technology does. Thus, when 
an electrical engineer is assigned the task of designing a power plant, he does 
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not issue a command such as 'Let electric power be!' Instead, he gets hold of 
his scientific knowledge and his wits, and produces a design that can resist a 
critical examination. His final recommendations or norms are not blind start­
ing points but thoughtful outcom�s of his work. Accordingly his conclusions 
are not categorical imperatives but conditionals of the forms If A produces B, 
and you value B, choose or do A. and If A produces B and C produces D, and 
you prefer B to D, choose or do A rather than C. In short, the rules he comes 
up with are based on both fact and value. I submit that this is the way moral 
rules ought to be fashioned, namely as rules of conduct deriving from scientific 
statements and value judgments. In short, ethics could be conceived as a branch 
of technology. How this project can be implemented will be outlined in the fol­
lowing section. 
5. Ethica more technico 
A technological rule boils down to a formula of the form To eet G do M, or 
To avoid G refrain from doine M, where 'M' stands for a means to a goal abbre­
viated 'G.'. In either case the rule, far from being arbitrary, is founded on some 
natural or s<>cial law of the form "If M then G (either always or with a fixed 
probability ]." Because there are no isolated variables there are no isolated 
events either; therefore every means and every goal is actually a conjunction of 
items. In particular so � goals: because every action has side effects, every 
goal is accompanied by side effects, some of which are disvaluable. Conse­
quently it ·is convenient to include the side effect(s) £ in the preceding form­
ulas, namely thus: 
Law: If M then G and S. 
�: ]'o eet G and S do M., To avoid G and S refrain from doine M. 
Such rules, let us repeat, combine scientific knowledge with explicit valua-
tion. The former consists in the underlying law. And the axiological compon­
ent consists in that M, G and .S.. are not just facts but facts evaluated by some­
body. I submit that a rational moral rule has exactly the same structure as a 
technological rule, in that both rest on scientific laws and explicit valuations. 
Drop the requirement that a rule should be founded on a scientific law and 
you get a rule of thumb, whether technological or moral, detached from the 
body of scientific knowledge and therefore hardly defensible or criticizable ex­
cept as regards its efficiency. And drop the requirement of explicit valuation, 
and you may underrate side effects and even confuse means and ends. In par­
ticular, fail to assess the means and you get either a costly technology or an 
inhumane morality. Furthermore I submit that the very setting up and use of 
technological rules is inseparable from ethical considerations. Indeed, it would 
be just as technically mistaken as morally wrong to aim for goals that are out­
weighed by either harmful means or negative side effects. Many a technical mis­
take is then a moral slip. In the age of technology, erring and sinning are be­
coming equivalent. 
The expected rejoinder from the antiscientiific quarter is that, no matter 
how much science and technology are injected into decision making, there 
will remain an arbitrary and irrational residue, namely valuation. This objec-
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tion rests on the false presupposition that values transcend facts (recall Section 
4) and on ignorance of the fact that valuations are made explicitly and daily in 
the fields of advanced technology and business administration. Moreover deci· 
sion theory, which involves values, is occasionally used in those fields. What is 
true is that the values there in question are subjective values or utilities, while a 
fully rational action theory ought to use objective values as well. I f  a theory of 
objective values were at hand we would be in a better position to make rational 
decisions and argue about them. That such a theory is feasible will be shown 
presently. 
6. Towards a value theory of means. goals, and side effects 
We proceed to outline a value theory that can serve as a basis for weighing 
means, goals, and side effects, and thus help to make or adopt rules of conduct 
both technically feasible and morally right. 
Let S be a set of objects that can be evaluated by someone in some respect. 
The members of S shall be things or states of things or events-in particular 
human actions. Some members of S shall have unique inverses, others won't. 
For example, if 'b' stands for giving, its inverse b stands for taking away-.not 
for not-giving, which is no action at all. And if 'b' stands for writing, 'b' will 
stand for erasing a piece of writing. When an element x of S happens to have a 
unique inverse x, then either x followed by x or x followed by x will equal the 
neutral or inane element e. Moreover, as has just been intimated, some members 
of S combine to form compound objects. If x and y are members of S, and they 
actually combine, the object resulting from their combination will be denoted 
as 'x + y.' We shall assume that this operation, where defined, is associative, i.e. 
that x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z. F\irthermore we assume that all members of S are 
idempotent, i.e. x + x = x for any x in S. But + is not defined for every pair of 
objects in S. That is, some compounds may not exist. For example, if b is giving 
birth, then 1> is killing, so that b + b is equal to e; but in this case b + b is not de­
fined: it is not a member of S, hence not a valuable object or even a disvaluable 
one. ln short, + is, like -, a partial operation on S. As a consequence + is not 
communative, i.e. x + y, even if it exists, is not necessarily equal to y +  x. When 
x + x happens to exist, it equals the neutral element e, which is assigned zero 
value. If the operations - and + were total, not partial , i.e. if S were closed. un­
der inversion and composition, the structure < .S. -, +,.e_> would be a group 
of idempotents. As it is, it will be said to be a partial Boolean group. 
Surely this is too coarse an algebraic structure for the set of objects of val­
uation, if only because (a) it makes no provision for the case when an object 
has more than one inverse (e.g. several antidotes to a given poison), and (b) 
it lumps disjunction and conjunction into the single operation +. A partial lat­
tice is a more suitable structure and the one I adopt in a more detailed investi­
gation in course, because it distinguishes options from conjunctions and it in­
corporates idempotence automatically. However, the simpler structure will do 
for our present purpose, which is just to show how value theory can serve as 
one of the legs of a rational ethics--the other leg being scientific knowledge·. 
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Next we introduce a valuation function V that assigns every object x in S a 
value V(x) that, for the sake of definiteness, may be taken to be a real number. 
(The converse is not true: several objects may be assigned the same value. That 
is, V ls not 1:1.) 'Ibis function is defined as follows: 
(i) the neutral element has zero value: V(!) = O; 
(ii) good and evil neutralize one another: if both.!. and its opposite x are in 
li, then V(x) + V(i) = O; 
(iii) unlike utility, value is additive: if.!. and _I.are different objects of valua­
tion, and x + yis defined, then V(x + y) :a V(x) + V(y). 
It is easily seen that V(x + x) "" V(x) and V(x + e) "' V(x) follow. Also 
V(X + y) - -V(x) + Y{y) is a theorem, and V(X" + x) "" 0 a corollary of the latter. 
For our present purposes no further consequences are needed. 
Let us now apply our value theory to ethics, i.e. to the evaluation of means, 
goals, and side effects. To this end we adopt the convention that, if .I!. and _g_ 
are any propositions, then E_ is the negation of .I!, and .Q. + _q the disjunction of 
.I!. and � Further, we assume that propositions obey the ordinary propositional 
calculus, and that the valuation function V applies to them, so that, 'V(p) - v' 
means that ..e_ is worth .Y.: 
Consider now an arbitrary rational rule, whether technological or moral, 
from our value-theoretic point of view. It will fit the schema "To get G and� 
do M", the ground or foundation of which is the law schema "If M, then 
G and .§_." Call f the value or effectiveness of this cognitive means and j_ the val­
ue of the goal G. That is, set 
V(M �G&fil -f ,  V(G) - i: 
Our task is to unpack the separate values of M and � and to relate them to! 
and!: This is done with the help of logic. In our notation, 
whence 
M �G&S = M + (G&fil , and G&S - G&S .. (G + fil, 
M�G&S - M + (G + fil. 
By our calculus 
J_ = V(M �&fil ,.. -V(M) - V(G + fil ... -V(M) + V(Q) + V(fil. 
Hence finally, calling V(M) "" m and V(§) ""_§_, we obtain a central theorem: 
'That is, the practical means combined with the cognitive means balances the 
goal combined with the side effect. Shorter: the total input or cost equaJs the 
total output or benefit. Thus valuable knowledge (of the means-end relation­
ship) can offset the cost of the practical means, whereas defective knowledge 
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calls for greater investment in practical means. (Moral: Support research.) For 
example, if.!.• 1 then m "" �  + i - 1, whereas if i - ·1 then m - � + � + 1,  which 
may be ruinous. And in all cases the goal is worth} just 'in case the means, too, 
is worthy. Indeed, � < 0 if and only if m + ..i.> ..s. Good breeds good, and evil, 
evil. The better the means, the more valuable the goal. 
Our final fonnula suggests the following rules of conduct: 
Rl To assess a goal, evaluate it jointly with the side effect--i.e. estimate the 
total value L + � 
R2 Match the means t<> the goal both technically and morally: employ only 
worthy practical means and optimal knowledge. 
R3 Eschew any action where the output fails to balance the input, for it is 
either inefficient or unfair. 
In sum, instead of accepting rules of thumb in the realm of morals we can, 
and should, try to fonn them in the image of technological rules, i.e. on the 
strength of factual knowledge and objective valuation. 
Summary and conclusions 
(i) Unlike pure science, which is intrinsically valuable or at worst and on oc­
casion worthless, technology can be valuable, worthless or evil, according to 
the ends it is made to serve. Consequently technology must be subjected to 
moral and social controls. 
(ii) Evil technology can be eliminated only by discarding evil goals. And the 
misuses of good technology are corrected and averted not by slowing down all 
technological research but by promoting good technology and rendering it 
morally and socially sensitive. 
(iii) The technologist, just as everybody else, is personally responsible for 
whatever he designs, plans, recommends, or executes. Hence he is just as sub­
ject to praise and blame as anyone clse--actually even more so because of the 
rational character o! his decisions. 
(iv) The technologist is responsible not only to his employer and his pro· 
Cession but also to all those likely to be affected by his work. And his primary 
concern should be the public good. 
(v) The technologist who contributes to alleviating any social ills or to im· 
proving the quality of life is a public benefactor. But he who knowingl)J contri­
butes to deteriorating the quality of life, or deceives the public, devising worth­
less or dangerous products or disseminating false information, is a public crim­
inal. 
(vi) Because no single specialist can cope with all of the many-sided and 
complex problems posed by large-scale technological projects, these should be 
entrusted to teams of experts in various fields, including applied social scientists, 
and should be placed under public scrutiny and control. 
(vii) Because of the strong impact technology is having on both society and 
the environment, the technologist should share power with the manager and the 
politician. Global technocracy, or the rule of experts in all fields of human ac­
tion,1.is not a threat but a promise, particulary if answerable to the public. 
(viii) Technologists should tackle their own moral problems rather than pre-
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tend that they can be transferred to managers and politicians. Moreover, they 
should contribute to the overhauling of ethics, attempting to construct a tech­
noethics as the science of right and efficient conduct. 
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